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MS. COLEMAN:

Good morning, everyone.

We

are going to get started on the second session.
Welcome to our panel.
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discussing merger retrospectives.

I’m Mary Coleman

with Compass Lexecon and I’ll be moderating the panel.
I’m pleased to welcome several distinguished
speakers to our panel.

First, on my right we have

Bruce Kobayashi, who is the current Director of the
Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission.
Next to him is Lee Van Voorhis, who is currently a
Partner at Jenner & Block.

Next to Lee is Leslie

Overton, who’s a Partner at Alston & Bird and who was
Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust
Division of DOJ from 2011 to 2015.

Finally, on the

end we have Ben Wagner, who is a Vice President at
Compass Lexecon.
In this panel, like the last panel, we have
a few different topics about merger retrospectives
that we are going to discuss.

We are going to do it

in a Q&A format, hopefully get some discussion going,
and we will try to open up to questions for the
panelists from the audience either at the end of topic
areas or certainly at the end of the session overall.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

3

When you do ask questions, I’ll try to
remember to remind people, if you can state your name
and where you are from, and if you can come to one of
the mics that are on the side, they are doing a
transcript and this will help them to hear the
questions being asked and know who asked it.
Before we get started, I would also like to
give Bruce a chance to give his needed disclaimer.
MR. KOBAYASHI:

I’ve been at the Federal

Trade Commission for over three months, so I’ve got
all the experience and knowledge that I’ll ever get
there.
The views expressed today are those that are
mine and not necessarily those of the Federal Trade
Commission or any of its individual Commissioners.
MS. COLEMAN:

To get started, we are first

going to talk a little bit about what are merger
retrospectives and the history.

Ben, if you can kick

us off and say briefly what is a merger retrospective
from an economic point of view?
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MR. WAGNER:

Sure.

I guess I’ll start from

a noneconomic point of view which is also an economic
point of view.

It’s really a backwards-looking

analysis after a deal — a full merger or a partial
merger, a joint venture — if it’s horizontal, any sort
of change in concentration, and just asking the
question, what was the result of this event?

Was it

good for consumers; was it bad for consumers; did it
have a competitively neutral impact?

And then, armed

with that information, which I will be talking a lot
about today, what does that mean; what can we do with
that information to inform general merger policy, a
deal that we’re evaluating currently; what lessons can
be learned, if any, from the results that we find; and
what can we do going forward?
From a more economic perspective, the way I
look at merger retrospective would be sort of like any
other event study.

If you’re trying to figure out

what the impact of a minimum wage increase is on labor
or if you’re trying to figure out what happened to
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prices because of an alleged cartel or what happened
when a competitor entered a market, those are all
event studies, and a merger retrospective is in the
same vein.

The context and the details are different,

but think about them similarly.
The way that is is:

What happened to some

outcome that you’re interested in that you think is
reflective of consumer welfare — price, quality,
quantity — so what happened?

And then the hard part:

What would have happened had this event not happened?
With the two of those components together, hopefully
you can try to attribute some of what you find to a
direct impact of the merger and maybe say that there’s
causality there and not that there was something else
going on.
MS. COLEMAN:

Thanks, Ben.

Bruce, the FTC has done a fair number of
merger retrospectives over the years.

Could you give

us a little history of the program at the FTC?
MR. KOBAYASHI:
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Probably actually one of the big events that
caused the FTC to start doing this, and we’ve been
doing them — I say “we” — the people preceding me have
done lots of retrospectives.
One of the events that caused the FTC as an
agency to think a lot about merger retrospectives was
losing six, and then by the time the retrospective
program was in full bloom eight, hospital cases in a
row.
At the time those cases used the ElzingaHogarty Test to do market definition.

If you

remember, Elzinga-Hogarty measured the flow of
patients in and out of regions and you had some
arbitrary thresholds (15, 25 percent) and you
increased the geographic market until those thresholds
were met.

What was happening was we would see mergers

of the only two hospitals in a rural area, but that
rural area was not a market under the Elzinga-Hogarty
Test because there was a significant number of
patients who would go to the medium-sized city 125
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miles away.
Theoretically people noted that that was
problematic because the people who were going 125
miles usually were going for something that maybe
wasn’t offered or wasn’t offered at the same quality
as the small hospitals.

In fact, they were

inframarginal rather than marginal consumers.
As a result of these, the geographic markets
were huge and we lost, and the DOJ also lost, seven
consecutive hospital mergers.
In 2002 my coauthor and colleague at Scalia
Law School Tim Muris, and a former Chairman of the
FTC, said:

We need to sort of look back to see what

happened in all these cases that hopefully we didn’t
screw up.

We wanted to challenge them, but maybe the

people making the calls, the judges, did.
They subpoenaed data from hospitals and
insurance companies and they actually estimated, as
Ben set out, the price effects of four hospital
mergers.

There was an existing article by Mike Vita
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and Seth Sacher on the competitive effects of
nonprofits [The Competitive Effects of Not‐for‐Profit
Hospital Mergers: A Case Study], and, out of Tim
Muris’s wish to look at these mergers, they also
published three Bureau of Economics working papers on
hospital mergers.

They found that these mergers which

we thought were problematic but the courts did not
resulted post-merger, after the mergers were
consummated, in large price increases.
It also suggested that we had a particular
problem in the use of our tools to define geographic
markets.

It caused us to adopt the tools that we use

today, which are the willingness-to-pay (WTP)
bargaining models.
That evidence was then used going forward,
and it has resulted in immediately the successful
challenge to the consummated merger in Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare/Highland Park and a rather
successful and robust hospital enforcement program
going forward.
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We have continued and under the current
leadership of the FTC plan to continue being selfevaluating, and critically self-evaluating.

So we

think that merger retrospectives are an important
thing to spend our resources on and learn what is
going on with what we do and the tools we use going
forward.
We currently, I think, in the Bureau have
six merger retrospectives ongoing in various stages of
getting published, being written, requesting data.

So

we continue to have a robust program at the FTC.
MS. COLEMAN:

Thanks, Bruce.

Leslie and Lee, FTC is clearly one source of
merger retrospectives.

Maybe you could talk a little

bit about other sources, either private sector or from
the DOJ side, Leslie, from your experience.
MS. OVERTON:

I’ll say the FTC has been more

active in merger retrospectives than the DOJ.
other agencies around the world have done
retrospectives and a lot of academics do
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retrospectives.

They are an important source.

Private parties commission retrospectives in certain
litigation or agency advocacy contexts.

So I think

really anyone who can get access to the necessary data
for the methodology they want to use and can put in
the demanding work that these take could do it.
MR. VAN VOORHIS:

I don’t have much to add

on that other than I think that Leslie’s last point
suggests why government agencies around the world are
best positioned oftentimes to do these.

It’s because

of access to the data necessary to do a retrospective
in the first place that is hard to come by for any
entity outside the government, whether a researcher or
a company.
MR. KOBAYASHI:
hard for us too.

I have to say that it’s also

If you think about all of our

hospital retrospectives, we buy the data like anybody
else.
Dan Hosken, who has done and still does a
lot of these retrospectives, did a lot of work with
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Matthew Weinberg and Orley Ashenfelter.
the data.

They bought

I think Orley bought the data because he

was concerned that if the FTC bought the data that he
would have a harder time if there was some fight with
Dan — which there wasn’t — getting it out.
One of the shocking things to me is that
there wasn’t any special advantage from being at the
FTC.

We go out and we buy the patient and insure data

just like anybody else.

I think from our perspective

we want to do that and it’s just really important in
terms of self-evaluation.
MS. COLEMAN:

Now we’ve talked a little bit

about what a merger retrospective is and something of
its history and the sources of merger retrospectives.
Now we want to move on to the topic of what
makes a good or high-quality merger retrospective.

To

start us off, Ben, can you just talk a little bit
about the basic methodology — or methodologies because
there’s more than one — that have been employed in
retrospectives or could be employed?
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MR. WAGNER:

Sure.

Just on that last point briefly, I think
Bruce enunciated why a lot of the retrospectives like
you were talking about were done by the FTC have been
these hospital ones, because that’s where you can
actually buy in the public domain the detailed sources
of data you need to get a somewhat robust result.
On the advocacy side, I have done a lot of
these.

Obviously, they are never going to see the

light of day in published journals or anything like
that.

But you can learn a lot when you have the types

of data that you need — sometimes you want detailed
cost data, detailed price data, at the product level —
but then you try to go out and look for something that
you can use in the public domain to study and to
publish.

It’s very difficult to get the kinds of data

you need to conduct these.

But, fortunately, working

with clients you get access to some of these sources
of data and you can do the kinds of detailed things
that you’d like to do to answer some of these
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questions.
The basic methodology that is pretty
standard now in these merger retrospectives is the
difference-in-difference (DID) methodology.

Basically

what you’re doing is you’re finding — like I was
talking about before, what you’re really interested in
is what happened after the merger and what would have
happened had the merger not occurred.
The first part if you have the data is
somewhat easy.

You can say, “Okay, here’s this event.

Here are some markets or products that were affected —
we’ll call those a treatment group.”

If it’s a

horizontal merger, that’s where the parties have
overlap.

Also, obviously, when you’re doing these

things there’s some question about what degree of
overlap are we going to study, and there is how big of
an overlap does it need to be to be in the treatment
group and lots of things.

Every single part of these

retrospectives has assumptions you have to make.
can get into some of those.
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Basically, you take a group of markets or
products, a treatment group, that is affected by the
merger and you have an outcome variable like I was
talking about earlier, like prices or quantity or
quality, and you look at the change in let’s say price
before and after the merger in the markets that were
affected — let’s say that prices go up $10.

Then you

have a group of markets that you think simulate what
would have happened absent the merger, that were
unaffected by the merger — let’s say prices in that
market went up $5.

So the inference there is that the

net effect of the merger was not to increase prices by
$10 but to increase prices by $5.
One way you can do that is by having a
control group, a group of markets unaffected by the
merger.

This can work pretty well when you have a

retail merger or a hospital merger and you have
geographic markets that are affected and geographic
markets that are not affected.

Hopefully you can say

that the factors that influence price, like cost for

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

15

example, would be similar in both those markets.
But sometimes that’s not so easy.

If you

have a retail merger that affects products all across
the United States — let’s say Coke and Pepsi were
merging and they’re in every single grocery store — so
what are you going to use as a control group?

Those

kinds of things can be difficult in those cases.
One thing you can try to do is estimate a
regression where you include a factor if you don’t
really have a control group where you try to control
what would have happened absent the merger by
controlling for things like cost and demand, and you
put those in the model and you can control for them,
and you can hopefully get an estimate of what happened
and you can say that it’s a causal estimate.

But the

kinds of data that are required to estimate a reliable
model are very hard to come by, so the standard
methodology that is typically used is this differencein-difference methodology.
MS. COLEMAN:
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Bruce, employing either the difference-indifference, which has the been more standard, but as
Ben said, if you wanted to estimate more of a model of
prices or other effects over time, what are some of
the issues that come up when you’re trying to do that
and make sure that you’re doing a high-quality, robust
study?
MR. KOBAYASHI:

I think all of the

retrospectives that the Bureau of Economics (BE) has
put out as reports are difference-in-difference.
won’t say diff-in-diff or DID.

I

But there are

problems.
If you use these things called fixed effects
to control for things that are common but that are
idiosyncratic differences that stay constant over time
in what we call in econometrics identification, that’s
generally the identification strategy that allows us
to say “A causes B” rather than “A is just somehow
related or correlated to B.”
When I teach my students statistics, there’s
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this great website that has all these correlations,
like number of Nick Cage movies and teenage suicide
and the correlation is 0.97.

This sort of gets at

that point.
What we like to do at the Bureau — and we
sort of have a methodology — is that we like to at
least have some plausible causal claim that what we
are measuring is the effect of the merger and not some
other effect.
One of the things we do is we ask two basic
questions when we’re thinking about a retrospective.
One is: Do we have the data?

The corollary to that

is: Do we know what our left-hand side variable is;
what are we trying to measure?
the price.

It’s not always just

Sometimes it’s the quality-adjusted price.

Sometimes it’s some larger metric of competition.
The second thing — and this is another big
thing as Ben pointed out — is: What’s the control
group?

We tend to look, at he said, at geographic

markets where you have the merger affecting some
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markets but not others, and you could use the
nonaffected geographic markets as a control group.
If we don’t have those, generally the Bureau
says we’re not going to do those, because in the end
if we find what we would call a first difference,
before the merger and after merger, and price goes up,
we have no idea whether or not that is due to the
merger or due to some other spurious effect.
The other way you can do it — and I think in
the CLE readings, or at least in the bibliography,
there are a few pieces by Dan Hosken with Matthew
Weinberg and Orley Ashenfelter, and one with Mike Vita
— you could do what I would call the old-style
structural models or reduced form models where you try
to stuff every important variable in a regression to
do the prediction and you have a dummy variable to
note whether or not it is after the merger, and then
you look at that dummy variable to see the price
effect.
The problem there is basically something
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called omitted variable bias.

If you leave out

something that is correlated with the stuff you put
in, then all of the variables that you put in,
including that dummy variable which you are using to
try to infer a causal effect of the merger, is
carrying that thing you left out.
Basically it’s the same problem.

Why do we

leave out stuff we think is important for correlating
with the stuff we put in?

Because (1) we don’t know

of (2) we can’t measure it.
So largely over the past decade there has
been this — it’s an unfortunate term — credibility
revolution in economics, where we’ve gone to causal
designs like difference-in-difference because that old
way of trying to get the model right is just too hard
and we never really achieve it.

At the Bureau almost

all the things we do are difference-in-difference and
then we require a control group.
MR. WAGNER:

Just another thought about the

control group is sometimes you can have a merger that
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affects lots of markets and sometimes you can have a
merger that affects a single market.

A lot of the

work that goes into this is trying to figure out if
the control group is appropriate.

If you have a

single market, you can do a lot of work trying to
figure out what’s the best approximation of this
place, of this city or metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) or whatever it is.

If you have forty markets

that are affected, you might have a harder time
finding a good control group and developing forty
control groups might be tough, but you also have more
events to study, so you might think that on average
the effect in those forty markets is telling you
something useful.
When I work on those things, they usually
fall into one of those two buckets: there’s one market
that’s affected and you can spend a lot of time really
trying to get a great control group; or there are lots
of markets affected and you can spend a little bit
less time but hopefully the average or you have a
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distribution around the effects in all those different
places.
MS. COLEMAN:

One of the issues that came up

in the first topic we were discussing and we’re
talking about here is the limits of rigorous access to
data.

As Bruce pointed out, a lot of what they do now

is work on studies where they can buy data or have it
from public sources.

Ben had noted that in some cases

on the private side you will do studies for a
particular deal because there’s a past transaction you
think might be informative of the current deal.
But, as Bruce had noted, in the beginning of
the hospital retrospectives there was subpoena power
used to gather information.

Maybe Lee and Leslie

could talk about whether that could be an appropriate
use in other situations and when that might be the
case and when it might not.
MR. VAN VOORHIS:

Yes.

I think there are at

least two, but two fairly significant concerns of
private parties to giving up the data and information
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that will be useful in these — I think admittedly
useful — in the merger retrospectives.
The first one is just strictly
confidentiality and whether you can have sufficient
confidentiality protections to give comfort to parties
that their information will not be put out there or
used in some way that is detrimental to the business.
The second one I think is equally as
significant — maybe more so — and that is I think
there might be a great fear of what the use of the
information will be by government enforcers when they
get it.

Justified or not, I think that this fear is

fairly prevalent.

Bruce even said in his remarks the

FTC’s impetus to do a hospital merger study was not
intellectual curiosity but rather losing cases.

Of

course that’s purely human nature that you want to go
back, and you are more often going to look at your
losses than your wins.

But I think that is a

legitimate justification for the fear.
I think we’ll talk about this a little maybe
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later, but when a company turns over information to a
government enforcer, it’s not just what they might
find out about a merger you had done but what else
they might find out about your industry to prompt some
new investigation.
Maybe there are safeguards that can be put
around this, guardrails that can be put around this —
we’ll talk about that later too — but I think there
are some rather big concerns for private companies in
providing the useful data.
While we’re talking about what information
could be used, without trying to preempt your role, I
have a couple of questions for the economists
actually.
In merger review itself, of course the
parties have produced documents and other information.
So one of my questions is: is that used in these types
of information?

Putting aside the very issues I’ve

just raised about getting it for the future, there are
certainly some public sources of documents — 10-Ks or
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whatever else — and I wonder if those are brought to
bear.
And then my second question: Another thing
that’s look at of course in merger review
prospectively is the role of innovation and market
dynamics and change.

I wonder to what extent that is

brought to bear in the merger retrospectives that have
been done thus far.

There are some cases that leap to

my mind as being particularly interesting that might
be looked at: things like Blockbuster/Hollywood
Entertainment, which got a lot of scrutiny, and
eventually that industry went away a very short time
afterwards; or Sirius/XM Radio, looking at the flip
side, got approved and now was that the right call; or
Whole Foods/Wild Oats, where natural and organic
supermarkets were maybe a thing but now everywhere has
that.
Back to the question, to what extent are
documents and documentary evidence brought to bear and
could they be brought to bear to enlighten the
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numerical data, and to what extent is innovation taken
into consideration?
MR. KOBAYASHI:
[Laughter]

I’ve been three months.

There’s a lot there.

Whole Foods is different.

There’s also when

we do merger investigations, which the FTC has done —
I mean Whole Foods was an instance where there was a
natural experiment.

You’re using the same kind of

difference-in-difference methodology to predict the
effects of mergers based on the reverse thing, where
what happened to grocery premium organic supermarket
prices, the basket, when you had entry into the market
and you think that the merger is just the reverse of
that.

I didn’t work in Whole Foods.
It did work in Staples/Office Depot, which

is another one where the FTC prospectively used
natural experiments to try to look at — you know, we
have a Fredericksburg, Virginia, and what happens when
Office Depot comes in or what happens when the BestBuy
comes in?

You can sort of both do market definition
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and just actually get some idea of direct effects
using the same kind of difference-in-difference
methodology.
There is a great paper I recommend everybody
read by Orley Ashenfelter, Jonathan Baker, and David
Ashmore on the econometric evidence in FTC v. Staples.
That was the 1996 one, not the 2015 one.

If you think

about innovation, I think the FTC challenged the
second go-around of Staples/Office Depot.

They did

the same type of natural experiment stuff on the
consumer side, said “Amazon, things change,” so they
did take it into account, and then they said, “But we
have a different problem, which is the business side.”
We do try to take those things into account
when we’re looking at mergers when we have natural
experiments —
MR. VAN VOORHIS:
MR. KOBAYASHI:

Retrospectively.
Retrospectively?

If you have innovation, it’s hard.
that falls into what’s the control group?
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falls into what’s your measure, because dynamic
markets are not impossible — we do think about them,
we think about them seriously — but they are harder to
get a grasp on even theoretically, but empirically
they are even harder.
We do like to look at the tools that we are
using and that I think we’re going to talk about.

The

merger shops both at DOJ and the FTC use a lot of
tools.

It’s no longer the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

(HHI).

It’s these first-order conditions: Upward

Price Pressure (UPP), Gross Upward Price Pressure
Index (GUPPI), Compensating Marginal-Cost Reductions
(CMCR).
There are a lot of retrospectives — and I
think this is the part where the agencies have the
advantage because in our merger reviews we use these
tools, the economists calculate it — and what you can
do in some of them, especially merger simulation, is
you get a price prediction.

So we could compare what

our price predictions were from the merger review and
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compare that retrospectively to actually what happens.
That is really the same thing as what Tim
Muris wanted to do in the 1990s when we were losing.
But we’re not necessarily losing; it’s the things we
let go.
It’s an important point to note that we
can’t do retrospectives on the things we block.

We

can only do retrospectives on the things that we
either decide not to challenge or we decide to
challenge but a court decides that we’re not going to
be able to enjoin the merger.
There is a big thing called selection
effects, which we only see one side of the ledger
there.

All of the transactions that we do block,

there are correct outcomes where we block
anticompetitive mergers, and I’ll guarantee you there
are going to be errors where we erroneously blocked
efficient mergers.

So that side we can’t even see.

I’ve probably said this.

I’m half joking.

But what you want to do ideally to learn stuff is to
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randomly select mergers on the margin and randomly let
them go just so you can get both sides.
every other setting.

We do that in

They usually tell me to take

Mike’s stuff out of my office or throw it out on the
street when I say this.

But random selection is

really a big part of having a causal design.

I mean

if you think of how we test drugs, we give half of the
people the potentially life-saving drugs and then we
give of very sick people a placebo.
learn stuff.

That is so we

It’s not that we want to harm the people

either taking the treatment or the placebo.
It’s very hard in this setting to even think
about doing that.

Even if you’re doing natural

experiments, like Office Depot, the joke is that entry
is not exogenous; entry occurs because of market
conditions.

So Staples or Office Depot comes into a

market because they’re not throwing darts at a map;
they’re basically looking at where they want to come
in.

So what’s the natural experiment there?

I guess

one way to do it is to send a bunch of people around
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with cans of gasoline and randomly burn down some
office supply stores, but that probably isn’t going to
pass any review board either.
And if you look at Whole Foods, that
certainly was brought up.
QUESTION [Cecile Kohrs]:

Burning down Whole

Foods?
MR. KOBAYASHI:

No, no, no.

This always

goes bad for me when I do this.
What comes up is the fact that the
experiments aren’t random selection.

You do see that,

I think, in Judge Hogan’s decision in Staples/Office
Depot.

There were a lot fewer events in Whole

Foods/Wild Oats than there were in Staples/Office
Depot, so you run into problems with statistical
precision and power and stuff.
I think one of the things to learn is we
have a lot of tools.
tools.

We don’t just blindly use those

And certainly we have a whole Bureau of

Competition who are looking at all of the normal
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things.
MR. VAN VOORHIS:

I didn’t mean them.

certainly know looking prospectively.

I

I just think of

where they could be brought to bear retrospectively as
well.
MR. WAGNER:

I agree with all that.

Just to

piggyback on that — I think Bruce mentioned this, but
maybe it deserves more note — if you have a direct
estimate or entry or through a merger retrospective,
it can be a substitute for market definition.
In the innovation point, let’s say there are
two competitors in your defined antitrust market,
Hollywood and Blockbuster, and you think These are the
only two guys in the market — or I guess maybe in this
example there would have to be three because we had to
be studying a merger — but you do that study and you
find that, “Okay,

there was no impact on price.”

So what does that mean?

One inference is

that the market was already competitive enough.

I

can’t exactly do a study to figure out who’s in it,
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with all these other people who are providing video,
but I can be reasonably certain there was no impact
from this increase in concentration.

So that must

mean that there are other competitors who were making
the market competitive enough such that I see no
effect.
In that case, to your point, Lee, obviously
if the event happened many years ago it’s not going to
be that relevant still, but maybe there are some entry
events that happened recently, or maybe you have a
merger from a few years ago and you have some entry
recently and you have two data points, and you can
look at those and you can say, “Oh, well when this
competitor entered there wasn’t much of an effect and
when I looked at this merger retrospective there
didn’t seem to be much there either, so it seems like
the market was — I don’t know exactly who the other
players are, but it seems like the market was already
competitive enough,” and so those direct effects can
be very important to the extent that you can actually
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get good and reliable estimates.
To Bruce’s other point, even if you could
randomly let through a few mergers, the test in these
things is not like testing drugs obviously.

You have

a lot of these assumptions you have to make and you
have to be able to figure out reliably if the effect
is a 10 percent increase on price, I bet there are
some assumptions you could change or make and now that
10 percent is 4 or 5 percent, and maybe that is a
whole different set of inferences that you have to
make.
MS. COLEMAN:

I think this may lead us

naturally into our next discussion, which is: what is
the role of merger retrospectives; why does it make
sense to conduct these?

We’ve thought about, and

we’ve already mentioned, different ways that they can
be useful.
Leslie, can you talk about can they be used
to test how well the agencies or the courts are doing
in making decisions about merger enforcement?
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MS. OVERTON:

I think they can be.

They do

have a role in informing how well the agencies are
doing.

I think it’s important though that they be

used as a tool but not given too much weight in terms
of saying how the agencies are doing.

You could have

an agency that does a very good job making a merger
enforcement decision based on what it has available to
it and then it turns out that there is a price effect
for some other reason.

I think it’s important to not

read too much into it.
I also think we don’t get merger
retrospectives evenly across the board.

There are

certain industries that they tend to be concentrated
in for reasons of data, congressional interest, other
reasons.

So I think it could present a misleading

picture if we look and say, “Oh, the merger
retrospective told us this; that sells us everything
about what the agency is doing.”
But I do think that there are definitely
benefits to an agency if an agency is able to get the
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data for the methodology that they are trying to use
and that they are able to take into account all of
these different issues that we are talking about.
These are hard to do, these are labor-intensive
studies, and I think that they can go off the rails.
So if you’ve got an agency that is willing to make
that commitment and is willing to be self-critical, I
think that’s valuable.
I do think it is also important to not read
too much into them because you don’t want to chill and
agency’s interest in doing retrospectives and being
self-critical.

You don’t want the agency to only

choose retrospectives that are going to reflect well
on the agency.
MS. COLEMAN:

Any responses to Leslie’s

comments from the panel?
MR. KOBAYASHI:

John Kwoka has a book

[Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A
Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy], which I think
commits some of those errors, and my colleague Mike
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Vita has written a defense of the agency.
I think one of the things that Leslie
pointed out which really deserves highlighting is that
if you look at his set of forty-nine or fifty
retrospectives, some of them are really old and a lot
of them are hospitals, airlines, retail, petroleum.
That’s where these things are.
Why are we interested in them?

We’re

interested in some sense because there are some
marginal mergers, but mostly those retrospectives got
done because there is data.
done?

Why are retail mergers

Because there’s something called Nielsen data,

which is scanner data and you get quantities and then
you get some noisy measure of price.

For hospital

mergers we can buy the patient and health insurer
data.

For oil there’s lots of good data.
There’s an old joke about the economist

under the streetlamp.

How many of you have heard the

economist under the streetlamp joke?
The economist loses his keys.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

A passerby

37

said to the economist, “What are you doing?”
He said, “I’m looking for my keys.

I

dropped them over there in the middle of the dark
street.”
He said, “Why are you looking under the
streetlamp if they’re over there?”
He said, “That’s where the light is.”
[Laughter]
There are lots of economist jokes.
mostly not jokes, they’re just mean.

They’re

[Laughter]

There’s “assume a can opener” and all of that stuff.
But in a sense what we have to remember is
what John did in his book.
interesting book.

It’s actually an

It’s a meta-analysis, taking a

study of the studies.

He sort of said, “Okay, here’s

the body of retrospectives, the body of studies, and
let’s do a study of studies and see what happens on
average.”
On average, the median price increase —
there’s a long right tail, so there’s a couple of
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mergers that led to an increase in price of 40−50
percent — but the median price increase is 0.8
percent.

Something like 30 percent are either

negative 5-to-0 or 0-to-plus-5 percent.
Part of what you don’t want to do is say,
“Well, the agencies have been permissive because in
half of the mergers that we look at versus
retrospectives the prices go up, and some of them go
up a lot.”
If you’re really doing optimal antitrust
enforcement and you go to the right margin — remember
we only see the mergers that we let go or a court lets
go; we don’t see all the mergers that we block — you
probably want to have something where the average or
the median effect is pretty close to zero, and you
think that there’s going to probably be around a 50
percent error rate on the side of the mergers that you
see.

If you go and you start blocking more mergers,

you are going to probably be causing the other type of
errors where you’re blocking anticompetitive mergers.
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But we don’t know because we don’t really see that.
So it’s a difficult task to over-infer about
what the agencies are doing and whether they are doing
something that’s too lax or too strong because of just
the strong selection effects and the limitations that
data put on us to look at mergers as a whole.
Plus they’re expensive.

Greg Werden has a

nice piece saying, “Look, you can’t just do these
things in a vacuum.

They’re actually quite hard to do

and they require a lot of institutional knowledge.

If

you don’t have that institutional knowledge, you’re
going to do a bad study.”
MS. OVERTON:

Let me just say too that the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has done a lot of work around
merger retrospectives and giving countries tools for
how to think about merger retrospectives — not telling
them one methodology, because as we’ve talked about
these are very, very difficult to do and it’s going to
depend on your data and your resources and a whole lot
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of other factors.

But there has been a good amount of

work that OECD has done to help countries understand
the considerations for using merger retrospectives for
self-assessment.
MR. WAGNER:

One of the points of that

Werden piece is that it’s hard to do these things.
One of that criticisms of that Kwoka book is that he
didn’t present any distributions around what those
effects are.

To get right what the but-for world is

and to get right what the effect is, he sort of treats
these things as precise estimates, but there’s going
to be a range of assumptions you can make, it’s not an
exact science, and some of those distributions might
be large.
When you think about doing testing of merger
simulation versus what happened from a merger, you
can’t take for granted that what happened after the
merger is exactly correct.
The way I see it is you can do a bunch of
different assumptions and hopefully test different
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things and you get a range of outcomes and hopefully
that range of outcomes points in a certain direction,
and combined with other evidence, documentary evidence
and things like that, can point you to the truth.

But

it’s hard to put precise estimates on these things,
and some of the inferences that you’re trying to make
when using precise estimates — “Well, the simulation
predicted 5 percent, but the actual fact was 8 or 9
percent” — to one person that might be bad; to another
person, “Well, that’s pretty good.”
But these things are difficult and there’s a
lot of effort, like we’ve talked about, that goes into
it.
make.

There are reasonable assumptions that you have to
That’s just something to be cognizant of.
MS. COLEMAN:

Bruce had brought up earlier

that the hospital retrospective study in Evanston was
used to successfully block a consummated merger, and
there certainly have been other challenges to
consummated mergers in recent years.

When can merger

retrospectives potentially be useful to either side in
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challenging consummated mergers and what issues arise
in conducting such analyses?
MR. VAN VOORHIS:

I think there is a

difference between “when can they,” which might be
fairly frequently, and “when should they,” which is
arguably never.

[Laughter]

I think that you have to see there is at
least the possibility of a different viewpoint on the
hospital study and what happened as a result of it,
whether that’s a positive or a negative thing.
But, more neutrally, I think you do have to
evaluate the policy considerations, of whether it’s a
good policy to take merger retrospectives and
challenge specific consummated transactions.
This goes back to what I was talking about
earlier in terms of getting the data.

We all

acknowledge getting the data and information necessary
to do a good retrospective is a real challenge on top
of all the other challenges that we’ve talked about in
doing a merger retrospective.
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If the goal is to encourage private entities
to allow their data and information to be used in a
merger retrospective, then I would argue that there’s
got to be some protection given as to how that data
will be used.

This is, I think, a very specific one

that goes to the fear I mentioned before about turning
over the data only to find it thrown back in your face
that you have done something — maybe it’s a
consummated merger, or maybe something else, some
other behavior — and you have an enforcement action
against you when all you were doing was trying to help
merger retrospective studies to deliver better tools
and better analysis in the future, which I think we
all agree is probably the point of doing these merger
retrospectives, putting John Kwoka’s book to one side.
That’s my point on those.
MS. COLEMAN:

Other thoughts about using

retrospectives for consummated mergers?
[No response]
Ben, you’ve talked a little bit already
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about using merger retrospectives to assess a proposed
merger in the same industry where there was some
previous merger.

Can we talk a little bit about when

that might be appropriate, again what issues, and I’d
like to hear everyone’s experience at and before the
agencies of trying to put forward such retrospective
studies or when the agencies do them themselves?
MR. KOBAYASHI:

The FTC sees them.

Sometimes they occur as part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
filing, which I think Ben mentioned.
Chris Garmon has just published a paper in
RAND.

Chris did a lot of this work when he was at the

Bureau of Economists at the FTC, where he said, “Let’s
evaluate our tools that we use in hospital mergers.”
I think he looked at seven consummated hospital
mergers doing our traditional hospital retrospectives.
One is the pay model and using those to get price
predictions.

He looked at HHIs, whether they are

predictive; the first-order Upper Pricing Pressure
(UPP), and CMCR.
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looked at how all these tools would have informed, at
least on the economist side, the merger evaluation and
then compared it to what the retrospective did.
I think that is really an important thing to
do because, like all tools — whether it’s in the old
days when I was last at the agency when we used
structural tools to do screens or you use these newer
tools — it’s really important to see how well they
work.
The parties can and certainly do use them to
say, “Your tools aren’t very good” or “they overpredict price increases here.”

So we see them.

A lot of the problems that I think we see
with these retrospectives is, as Ben said, they are
just estimates.

Our tools, our predictions, the

estimates of the price increase are estimates, they’re
not actual causal effects of the merger.
standard errors.

So they have

A lot of times people are arguing

they’re zero, and they are actually not zero; the
point estimate is positive, but they’re just not
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significant.

That’s a problem of not having enough

data and not having enough precision in your
estimates.
When you want your parties to come in, the
thing you’ll hear from the Bureau of Economics is
“What’s the power of your test?”
economist what that means.

Ask your consulting

It means is your test

likely to detect a small-but-significant price
increase if it was there?

So significance is not just

the only thing that we care about.

We also care

about, “Well, okay, what if there was a price
increase; would your test detect it?” and that’s the
issue of power.
MR. WAGNER:

What we’re trying to do is

figure out what is going to happen before the merger
and what’s going to happen after the merger.

You’re

trying to make a prediction.
One tool is saying, “Well, if there’s a
merger in the same industry — maybe even one of the
parties involved in this deal had a prior merger —

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

47

that’s obviously a data point possibly among other
data points that can help you infer what is going to
happen after this deal.”
I think Mary’s question is when is it useful
to do a merger retrospective to inform what’s going to
happen in this deal?

Setting aside let’s say that you

could get the estimate exactly correct from the prior
retrospective, you would want to know are the parties
in the merger you are studying selling a similar
product to what they’re selling in the deal that you
have.

Is it the same product market or is it

differentiated enough such that maybe this doesn’t
bear on the current deal?
What was the change in the level of
concentration in a horizontal deal, the deal that
you’re studying, versus the deal that has been
proposed?

Maybe you might think, This merger I’m

studying will only change concentration by X, and this
deal is bigger, so we can learn something; but if it
was the same size change in concentration, maybe that
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would be better.

Or When did that prior event happen?

Have there been changes in the industry since that
event that you’re studying such that it doesn’t make
it very relevant anymore?
These are some of the things that you would
want to consider if you wanted to say, “This prior
merger that I’m studying in this industry, possibly
even with one of the same firms that’s involved in the
deal now, has a bearing on what I think is going to
happen as a result of this merger.”
I don’t know how I’d weight those things,
but those are the things that I’d think about when
trying to say that this has a bearing on the current
deal or not.
MS. COLEMAN:

Lee and Leslie, you are in a

deal like this and your consulting economists are
saying, “We think it worthwhile to look at this.”
What is your reaction?

How do you work with the

client to figure out does it make sense to invest in
this sort of a project?
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MS. OVERTON:

I think I’d take into account

the types of factors that Ben was talking about.
For example, how similar is the product?
Just to give an example of a real-life use of a merger
retrospective in a new merger, in the GE/Electrolux
matter there was a merger retrospective related to
Whirlpool/Maytag.
machines.

Whirlpool/Maytag involved washing

In the new deal the government said that

the problem was in cooking appliances.
argue that they are all appliances.
government wasn’t persuaded.

But one could

I think the

We don’t know whether a

court would have been persuaded or not because the
parties abandoned while the case was at trial.
But I would want to know.

These are such

big undertakings and the government is so likely to be
skeptical of it, I would want to have a really good
case, really good data, really strong similarity,
before I invested the resources.
MR. VAN VOORHIS:
Leslie said.

I agree with everything

I think the practical considerations
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narrow it to a fairly small set of cases where it
makes sense.
I think it also has to be a deal with large
enough parties and a large enough deal that the
investment of the resources makes sense, even if
everything else factored in its favor.
So I think the practical considerations
severely limit the willingness of the parties to
undertake this in a unique transaction.
MR. WAGNER:
thing to mention.

I guess there is one other

There was a discussion of

efficiencies earlier today.

If you do have an event

where the acquiring party is now making another
acquisition, you might use one of the prior deals to
test one of your efficiencies arguments.

That’s

another place where it might be useful.
I would say obviously if one of the parties
in the deal was involved in the prior deal, as opposed
to two other competitors, that is probably a good
place to focus in general.
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MS. OVERTON:

I agree with that, Ben.

I

think parties can improve their credibility on the
issue of efficiencies if — we’re not talking about a
full-blown retrospective study, but if they can show
that they actually did achieve efficiencies in past
deals, I think that could be helpful for their
credibility.
MS. COLEMAN:

One last topic, and we’ll try

to keep this short so we can give some chance for
people to ask questions.
out to the group:

Maybe I will just throw it

Where do we go from here?

Are

there things that we should be doing differently that
is already being done in this area?

Are there some

some areas that might be a good prospective area to
look at merger retrospective studies, or are we
getting it right and doing them when you can and not
doing them when you can’t, when you don’t have the
data to do them?
MR. VAN VOORHIS:

I have two ideas, one

specific and one more general.
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The first I was talking about a little bit
before, and I throw it out as a challenge to all the
economists in the room, although I think there is a
role for lawyers in this.

That is, is there some way

from the types of transactions I mentioned before —
the Blockbuster/Hollywood and Sirius/XM and Whole
Foods, and I’m sure there are multiple others — some
way from those to generalize some measures of the
innovation effect in a merger retrospective so that
it’s not industry-specific?
ideas.

I don’t have any great

Is it something the parties said and the

parties argued in those transactions, that X
innovation was going to happen in Y time, and we can
compare that across when we’re looking back at those
and others?
I also recognize there is likely to be a
sample size problem here that limits the scope of
rigorous economics.

Maybe there is a role for lawyers

where there is some sort of joint effort in doing that
to look back.

But I think that to my mind that is
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potentially a fruitful ground to look back and do some
retrospective in that way.
My second one is more general and more
process-oriented.

As I’ve talked about some of these

issues and we’ve talked about some of these issues in
getting the data and how you do this, I’ve tried to
focus on what might make the business world more
inclined to participate and to make it easier to get
as much data and information as possible to do these?
I wonder if there’s not something like the
Army Materiel Command (AMC) that could be created with
a specific goal of doing merger retrospective studies.
That is, a public-private partnership that in some
ways is insulated and separate from the enforcers to
give that comfort that I was talking about that the
data and information doesn’t go to enforcers
specifically.
I recognize there are other problems.

There

is still the confidentiality problem that would have
to be solved.

I think there is is the issue of peer
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review, and if you can’t have your results peer
reviewed by enforcers, at what level do you get to
that?

And would this entity have subpoena power, and

lots of other things.
It’s a very broad idea and you would need
the political will for Congress to make this happen.
But I wonder if there isn’t some way to set something
aside in that way, ring-fence it, so that we could
really improve upon the quality of our merger
retrospectives in a big way I think actually with the
data that’s out there in the world.
MS. COLEMAN:

Any other responses or

thoughts?
MR. KOBAYASHI:

The data issue — the FTC has

subpoena power under 6(b) to require people to have
data.

We’ve had mixed experiences with that in line-

of-business data.
subpoena power.

Under Tim Muris we used our
I think as an enforcement agency we

have to be self-critical, and we have to do them and
we will continue to do them when we can.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

55

I think we’re also very cognizant of the
burdens and all the other issues involved with using
our subpoena power.

So we’re not willy-nilly going

off and doing a retrospective study.
One of the things that you have to solve —
you know, any academic could do this.

There are a

couple problems.
One of the things that you would want to do,
if you really wanted to make inferences about the
overall level of things that we are doing at the
enforcement agencies, is you’d want to do a lot of
retrospectives, you’d want to do them at the margin,
and you’d probably want to do some off the margin.
Dan Hosken and Orley Ashenfelter did a study
where they looked at five mergers that they thought
were marginal and then they did the same number that
they thought were non-marginal.

They found that HHI

was actually as an initial screen useful because for
the ones off the margin they didn’t find price effects
in four out of the five and for the ones at the margin
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that were let go they found the opposite.
There are those things.

You can have

outside academics do it just as well as us.

They just

have to interest them in doing it.
The one problem is there is something called
publication bias.

Studying this merger and there are

no effects — that could be great for my career in my
tenure file.

That’s a serious problem to correct.

I

as an academic have been an associate editor on
journals and I love zero/no-effect papers because I
think they’re really valuable, as long as they have
enough power.

But there are a lot of incentive

problems that you have to correct.
I think what we are doing at the Bureau of
Economics is that we are continuing to be committed to
doing retrospectives whenever we can and giving staff
time, really critical and scarce staff time, to people
to do these studies.

We do actually have that

enforcement knowledge and when we can give people
access to that data we like to do them as frequently
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as possible.
MS. COLEMAN:

I want to leave the last few

minutes to give a chance for people to ask questions.
Just a reminder.

If you have a question, we

ask you to go to one of the mics and identify who you
are and where you’re from.
QUESTION [off-mic] [James Keyte]: I won’t
use a microphone.

I’m James from Fordham.

Just a quick question on hospital merger
retrospective studies and this move to willingness-topay.

How do you deal with the situation — and I don’t

have a horse or a dog in this race — how do you deal
with the situation where you don’t have competitive
overlap but under a willingness-to-pay theory maybe
it’s almost a conglomerate-like merger?

You’re going

to have a higher willingness to pay — you could call
it a quality-adjusted price.

It’s just there’s this

one conglomerate, you’re collecting different
hospitals, so dealing with managed-care companies you
have more power, but there’s no competitive overlap at
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all.

So you might have some but-for kind of issues.
MR. KOBAYASHI:

We have a term for that.

It’s called cross-market effects.

Is that what you’re

talking about?
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]: Maybe it’s
for the lawyers.
MR. KOBAYASHI:

No.

We have a couple of BE

staffers who are really good, actually Ted Rosenbaum
and Devesh Raval, I believe.
people who do a lot.

There are a bunch of

Keith Brand is another one; Dave

Balan.
They always look at those effects.

I don’t

believe we’ve found one that we thought was warranted.
Patients aren’t going to drive 300 miles, but the
insurers may have.

Under the willingness-to-pay model

there might be an effect.

It might be sort of a

coalition-type threat point type thing.

Those are

part of the willingness-to-pay models.
It may be that two hospitals are not close
enough for people to drive to on the patient side, but
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it may be that there is enough overlap that insurers
are concerned.

So we always look at those.

I think

that’s a standard thing that both the economists and
the lawyers look at.
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:
right.

All

So you’re just really looking at the insurers

as the consumer.
MR. KOBAYASHI:

That is the WTP model,

right?
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:
MR. KOBAYASHI:

Okay.

Then our theory is that if

the insurers raise their price, then consumers in one
way or another, whether it’s the premium or fee-forservice.
That model is all set out in the literature.
Chris Garmon’s paper in RAND is a neat paper because
it just really sets out what has become a standard
model.

It’s not a standard model, it’s a series of

models, so there’s a WTP, there’s a UPP version.

They

still look at how far consumers are willing to drive.
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QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:

Yes,

although that wouldn’t [inaudible].
MR. KOBAYASHI:

The big problem is to sort

out the inframarginal from the marginal consumers.

I

think Ted Rosenbaum and Devesh are working on that.
Not to go back to my burning down hospitals,
but Ted and Devesh have this really neat paper on
natural disasters.

There were no gas cans and people

burning down hospitals, but they look at when natural
disasters close hospitals for extended periods of time
and they use that as a natural experiment to see what
goes on with the pricing.

I think it was Katrina or

one of the big hurricanes that took out a whole bunch
of hospitals in a geographic market.
So we are using a lot of the techniques —
not necessarily to do enforcement, but to learn.
MS. OVERTON:

And Leemore Dafny at Harvard

has done a lot of work in that area, too.
MR. KOBAYASHI:

Right.

QUESTION [off-mic]:
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from Murdoch University.

I just have a question for

Bruce.
You talked about the retrospectives on
consummated mergers and defined that it did result in
competitive harm as a significant price increase.

Is

there any potential enforcement action that can be
done given that this is a consummated merger?
MR. KOBAYASHI:
consummated mergers.

Yes, we have the power to do

I think what the Bureau of

Economics does is we do these studies to evaluate our
tools and then the Commission can do what they like.
There are a bunch of mergers that we don’t
see under Hart-Scott-Rodino.

There is a paper by

Thomas Wollmann, who’s at the University of Chicago,
that looks at what happened after they raised the
Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds [Stealth Consolidation:
Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act (2018)].

There is a bunch of mergers that we used

to have premerger notification on that we do not
anymore.
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But we do non-Hart-Scott-Rodino enforcement.
We do consummated mergers.

In fact, the Northwestern

Memorial HealthCare/Centegra Chicago hospital merger
was a consummated merger.

I think the reason that the

antitrust enforcement agencies went to premerger
notification was that it’s hard.
it’s a bad idea.

As Lee was saying,

I think the term is it was a

“Pyrrhic victory,” that you end up spending a lot of
money and it doesn’t — the first panel is remedies,
right?

There is no remedy, the eggs are scrambled,

and so you spend a lot of money and you don’t do
anything.
But there are things where we could do an
enforcement action against a consummated merger if we
learn about it.

We still have conduct cases, and

those aren’t mergers.

We usually look at everything.

So it’s possible.

I don’t know if there’s

any direct case where we did a retrospective and then
we went out and sued somebody.
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I just don’t know.

Any other questions?
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[No response]
I’d like to thank all the panelists for
participating and now everyone can head out to lunch.
[Adjourned 12:15 p.m.]
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